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Abstract
This paper concerns optimal income taxation in the presence of
emigration. The basic model is a two-period model where all agents
are identical and live in the home country in the ﬁrst period of life,
b u tw h e r es o m ee m i g r a t ea tt h ee n do ft h eﬁrst period. It is shown
that with a binding credit restriction, the government will tax labor
income in the ﬁrst period at a higher rate than otherwise, whereas
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1the labor income tax in the second period is unaﬀected by emigration.
With heterogenous agents, the labor income tax in period two will be
aﬀected by emigration.
Key Words: optimal taxation, labor mobility, intertemporal con-
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1 Introduction
Emigration is a key issue in many countries. Since the most productive agents
are likely to be the ones who leave a country, emigration will erode the tax
base and thereby have a detrimental eﬀect on the capacity to provide public
goods, or fund publicly provided pensions, in the future. Emigration may
also reduce the beneﬁts of public investments in education because parts of
the future beneﬁts will leak out of the country. Both these aspects imply that
emigration is likely to be an important factor inﬂuencing economic policy.
Consequently, policy implications of labor mobility have received large atten-
tion in the optimal tax literature.1 One strand of the literature has focused
on the role of income redistribution within a ﬁscal federation.2 Another has
analyzed how governments should tax labor income from mobile agents who
divide their time between several jurisdictions.3
All above mentioned studies have one thing in common: they analyze
economic policy and emigration within a static framework. In a static frame-
1See, for example, Wilson (1982a,b), Wildasin (1991), Wilson (1992), Bjorvatn (1998),
Boadway et al (1998), Osmundsen (1999), Aronsson and Blomquist (2003), Sato (2004),
and Simula and Trannoy (2006).
2See, for example, Wildasin (1991).
3See, for example, Osmundsen et al (2000).
2work, an agent emigrates if the utility of moving abroad exceeds the utility of
staying at home. This implies that if the domestic income increases relative
to the income that can be attained abroad, emigration will decrease. This ﬁts
the stylized facts concerning emigration from countries with a relatively high
per-capita income but it does not ﬁt the stylized facts concerning emigration
from poor countries. Rather, for poor countries, the propensity to emigrate
seems to increase with rising income levels. This empirically observed rela-
tionship between emigration and the per capita income has been labelled the
inverted U-curve.4 A number of costs, including a purely monetary cost of
moving but also various cultural, linguistic and political “costs”, have been
introduced in order to explain both why people generally are less mobile than
the standard theories predict but also why people tend to be less mobile in
very poor countries than in slightly richer countries.
We believe that to account for the income-emigration pattern observed
in poor countries, it is essential to analyze emigration in an intertemporal
framework and recognize that agents are likely to face credit restrictions, i.e.
they may not be able to ﬁnance the move abroad by borrowing on future
income. Rather, they most likely have to ﬁnance the move by ﬁrst working
in the home country to save for the ”ticket”. This means that agents who
choose to emigrate will give up consumption today in order to have a higher
consumption tomorrow. Consequently, their ﬁrst period consumption will be
lower than for the agents who choose not to emigrate (if both groups have the
same income). This implies that an increase in private income in the period
when potential emigrants still work in the home country will improve their
situation, in utility terms, relatively more than for the agents who choose not
to emigrate. This will have a positive eﬀect on emigration which may account
4See Fischer et al (1997).
3for the positive relationship between per-capita income and emigration which
we observe in poor countries.
The argument above leads to the following question: if the emigration-
income pattern diﬀers between countries, for the reasons laid out above, what
will be the consequences for economic policy? In this paper we analyze how
emigration inﬂuences the optimal tax and expenditure policy in a small open
economy. We use a stylized two-period model where all agents live and work
in the home country in the ﬁrst period of life but in the second period, some
agents may emigrate. Emigration gives rise to a negative tax base externality
in the second period and the government’s objective is to choose optimal
linear labor and capital income tax rates to ﬁnance the provision of a public
good in both time periods. We characterize the optimal tax and expenditure
policy and compare it to what it would have looked like if emigration would
have been zero. In the ﬁnal part of the paper, the model is extended to allow
agents to diﬀer in terms of labor productivity, and where only high-skilled
agents emigrate.
This paper contributes to the literature in primarily three ways. First,
we analyze the interaction betwen emigration and economic policy in an
intertemporal framework. This makes it possible to see how migration in-
ﬂuences both ex ante and ex post tax rates, as well as public expenditure.
Second, by introducing a binding credit restriction, we also introduce a fea-
ture which has been omitted in the earlier literature on economic policy and
emigration, but which may be a potentially very important characteristic
inﬂuencing many emigration decisions. Finally, we show that the extent to
which the optimal tax and expenditure policy is inﬂuenced by migration
depends on whether agents are homogenous or heterogenous.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic
4model with homogenous agents while Section 3 addresses the optimal tax and
expenditure policy in the basic model. In Section 4, we extend the model
to allow for heterogeneity in labor productivity between agents. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We will use a two-period model to analyze tax policy and emigration in a
small open economy, henceforth referred to as the ´home country´. The home
country is made up of three types of decision making units; private agents,
ﬁrms and a government. We start by characterizing the private agents.
2.1 The Private Agents
Private agents live for two time periods and they work and supply labor in
both time periods. There is no population growth and at the start of period
one, the economy is made up of N1 (exogenously given) agents. Each agent
has the option to emigrate. If it chooses to do so, it leaves the home country
at the end of period one and lives abroad in the second time period.
All agents have identical preferences and labor productivity, and the in-
stantaneous utility in period t, t =1 ,2, is written
φ(ct,l t,G t)=u(ct − e(lt)) + η(Gt) (1)
where ct is private consumption, lt the hours of work, Gt a public good,
and where e(lt) can be interpreted as the monetary value attached to the
disutility of work.5 The utility functions satisfy the standard conditions
u0,η 0 > 0 and u00,η 00 < 0. As for the function e(lt),w ea s s u m et h a ti ti s
5Another example of a study which has used a similar concept is Aronsson and Wehke
5constant elastic and satisﬁes e0,e 00 > 0. For notational convenience, we also
deﬁne xt = ct − e(lt). An agent’s intertemporal utility is represented by the










where β i sac o n s t a n td i s c o u n tf a c t o r .
Turning to the intertemporal budget constraint, it will diﬀer between non-
emigrating and migrating agents. Let us, therefore, begin by characterizing
the behavior of a nonemigrating agent.
Nonemigrating Agents











c1 =( 1− τ1)w1l1 − s1 (4)
c2 =( 1+¯ r2)s1 +( 1− τ2)w2l2 (5)
xt = ct − e(lt) (6)
where wt and τt are, respectively, the gross wage and the labor income tax
rate in period t, s1 is the saving made in period one and ¯ r2 is the interest
rate. For analytical convenience, we assume that ¯ r2 is an exogenously given
w o r l dm a r k e ti n t e r e s tr a t e .
(2006). The functional form u(ct − e(lt)) is also found in e.g. the labor market literature
regarding asymmetric information (see Blanchard and Fischer (1989)).
6Substituting equations (4) and (6) into equation (3) and maximizing w.r.t.
lt produces the following ﬁrst order condition
(1 − τt)wt − e
0 (lt)=0 ∀t =1 ,2 (7)
Deﬁning ωt =( 1− τt)wt to be the net wage, equation (7) implicitly deﬁnes a
labor supply function, lt = l(ωt), which is increasing in ωt. The assumption
that e0 (lt) is constant elastic implies that the labor supply function l(ωt) is
also constant elastic.




This is a standard condition for the optimal choice of intertemporal con-
sumption and combined with equation (7), equation (8) implicitly deﬁnes
s a v i n g sa saf u n c t i o ns1 = s(ω),w h e r eω =( ω1,ω 2). We will also consider
the special case when savings are zero. This is motivated by the fact that
in many developing countries, poor agents do not have enough means to
save for the future. Rather they would like to borrow money but usually,
the credit markets are simply not available for these types of agents. In
this situation equation (8) is redundant and we will refer to the situation
of a nonbinding credit restriction as Case 1, whereas the situation with a
binding credit restriction w i l lb er e f e r r e dt oa sC a s e2 .
Finally, observe that the indirect utility function associated with optimal
behavior, both in the case of a binding and a nonbinding credit restriction,
can be written6 as V (ω,G),w h e r eG =( G1,G 2).
Emigrating Agents
6However, for given levels of ω and G, the utility levels will of course diﬀer between
the two cases (unless the optimal savings decision features s1 =0 ).
7We now turn to the emigrating agents. It is assumed that all agents live and
work in the home country in the ﬁrst period of life. At the end of period one,
the agents who want to emigrate move abroad, which means that it is only
in the second period of life that an emigrating agent actually lives abroad.
Let p denote the emigration cost facing an agent and assume that this cost
must be paid at the end of period one. If we let the superindex "◦"d e n o t e
variables associated with an emigrating agent, the maximization problem for



















1 − p (10)
c
◦
2 =( 1+¯ r2)s
◦










where ¯ τ2 is the foreign tax rate and ¯ w2 the foreign gross wage. Let us deﬁne
¯ ω2 to be the foreign net wage and ¯ G2 to be the foreign provision of the public
good.
It is straightforward to verify that the ﬁrst-order condition for labor in
period 1 is identical to that of a nonemigrating agent, i.e. l◦
1 = l1 = l(ω1).
The optimal solution implicitly deﬁnes the indirect utility function for an





82.2 The Emigration Function
The emigration cost, p, is assumed to be distributed among the agents ac-
cording to a known distribution function D(p) with support [pmin,p max].A
agent will emigrate if V< V ◦, whereas he/she will not emigrate if V> V ◦.
Since the indirect utility function V ◦ is monotonously decreasing in the
emigration cost, it follows that if pmin is suﬃciently small to guarantee
V (ω,G) <V(ω◦,G ◦,p min),a n di fpmax is suﬃciently large to guarantee
V (ω,G) >V(ω◦,G ◦,p max), then there must exist a marginal agent with an
emigration cost pm, who is indiﬀerent between emigrating or remaining inside




Since agents with p<p m will emigrate, the number of agents who leave
the home country at the end of period 1 is given by M = N1D(pm).T h i s
equation, in combination with equation (13), implicitly deﬁnes an emigration




◦,G 2, ¯ G2
¢
(14)
Observe that this emigration function is independent of ﬁrst period public
expenditure. The reason is that η(G1) appears additively on both sides of
equation (13), so that it can be cancelled out. In the Appendix, we show















7We disregard the partial derivatives w.r.t. the exogenous foreign variables ω◦
2 and G◦
2.
9where the superindex "m" refers to the marginal agent. The partial deriv-
atives in equations (15) and (16) will play a key role for the results to be
derived below, and let us therefore interpret them in some detail.
Equation (15) implies that the sign of ∂M/∂ω1 depends on whether xm
1
is larger or smaller than x1. One can show that xm
1 >x 1 can only occur (i) if
the agents can freely borrow money to ﬁnance the consumption in period one
and (ii) if the net income diﬀerence in period two of emigrating or staying at
home is large enough to satisfy the following inequality
¯ ω2l(¯ ω2) − ω2l(ω2)
(1 + ¯ r2)
>p m (17)
Inequality (15) says that if the discounted value of the net income diﬀerence
in period two is larger than the emigration cost for the marginal agent, then
the marginal agent can aﬀord to have a higher consumption than the none-
migrating agents. In this situation, an increase in ω1 will increase the utility
for a nonemigrating agent by relatively more than for the marginal agent.
This makes it more attractive than before not to emigrate which, in turn,
reduces the number of emigrating agents, i.e. then ∂M/∂ω1 < 0.T h i sc o r -
responds to the standard view in the migration literature, where a reduction
i nt h ei n c o m ed i ﬀerence between countries reduces emigration from the poor
country.
If, on the other hand, (i) the discounted value of the net income diﬀerence
in period two of emigrating or staying at home is smaller than the cost of
migration for the marginal agent8, i.e. if the inequality in (15) goes in the
other direction, or (ii) if the agents face a binding credit restriction, then
8Note, however, that an agent may still want to emigrate in this situation if the provi-
sion of the public good abroad in period 2 is suﬃciently large compared to the domestic
provision of the public good in period 2.
10x1 >x m
1 .I nt h i ss i t u a t i o n ,a ni n c r e a s ei nω1 will increase the utility for the
marginal agent by relatively more than for the nonemigrating agent. This
will make it more attractive than before to emigrate which increases the
number of emigrating agents, i.e. then ∂M/∂ω1 > 0.T h i si si nl i n ew i t ht h e
observation made in the introduction, where emigration from poor countries
seems to increase with disposable income.
Since these diﬀerences in emigration patterns will play a key role for
the design of public policy, it is interesting to analyse both the case when
∂M/∂ω1 < 0 (i.e. when there is no credit restriction, which corresponds
to Case (i) deﬁned above) and when ∂M/∂ω1 > 0 (i.e. when the credit
restriction is binding, which corresponds to Case (ii) deﬁned above).
2.3 The Firms
The production sector of the economy is made up of competitive ﬁrms. They
produce a homogenous good which can be traded on the world market. The
world market producer price is treated as ﬁxed and is normalized to one, and
we also normalize the number of ﬁr m st oo n e .I ne a c ht i m ep e r i o d ,t h eﬁrm
uses labor and physical capital in the production process, which is described
by a constant returns to scale (CRS) production function, F (Kt,L t),w h e r e
Kt is capital and Lt = Ntlt. The production function is increasing and con-
cave in both arguments, and capital and labor are complements in production
in the sense that the cross derivative in F (Kt,L t) is positive. Capital is hired
on the world capital market while labor is hired on the domestic labor mar-
k e t .T h er e n t a lc o s to fc a p i t a li sg i v e nb yRt =¯ rt +θt,w h e r e¯ rt is the world
interest rate and θt a domestic tax on capital. The ﬁrm´s total cost in period
t is given by RtKt + wtNtlt. Normalizing the production function w.r.t. Lt,
we obtain f (kt)=F (Kt,L t)/Lt,w h e r ekt = Kt/Lt is the capital stock per
11working hour. We can now write the ﬁrst-order conditions as








which need no further interpretation.
2.4 Equilibrium
Since M agents emigrate at the end of period one, N2 = N1−M agents remain
in the home country in period two. Combining N2 = N1−M, lt = l(ωt),a n d
ﬁrst-order conditions (18) and (19), respectively, the equilibrium wage rates
and the equilibrium capital stocks in period t can be written as functions of
the government´s decision variables
w1 = w(θ1),K 1 = K (θ1,τ 1) (20)
w2 = w(θ2),K 2 = K (θ2,τ 2,M) (21)
where we have omitted the notation of the exogenous foreign interest rate and
the constant N1. Note that the equilibrium wage rates are neither inﬂuenced
by the labor income tax rate, nor the level of migration. This is a consequence
of the functional form of the production function: under CRS, equations (18)
and (19) uniquely determine wt as a function of θt only.
3 Optimal Policy
Turning to the government, we assume that its objective is to maximize
the utility of the nonemigrating agents, subject to a minimum restriction,
¯ V ◦, on the emigrating agents´ utility. However, note that the utility of an
12emigrating agent is strictly larger than the utility of a nonemigrating agent,
i.e. V< V ◦ (except for the marginal agent where V = V ◦
m). This implies that
if the government´s minimum utility restriction for the emigrating agents is
not larger than the utility the government wants the nonemigrating agents
to achieve, i.e. if ¯ V ◦ <V, which we will assume, then the minimum utility
restriction will not be binding.
The intertemporal framework is very simple. Since there are only two
time periods, the government´s problem is to determine the optimal tax and
expenditure policy for the two time periods. It is straightforward to apply
this model within a more general overlapping generations framework, but for
our purpose it is suﬃcient to consider only two time periods; before and after
emigration takes place, since this captures the essentials of the problem we
want to analyze.
There is a potential time inconsistency problem. The reason is that in
the second period when emigration has already taken place, there may be
an incentive for the government to change the labor income tax rate and the
public expenditure announced in the ﬁrst period. Although this potential
problem is recognized, we follow previous studies in optimal taxation, such
as Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) and Aronsson et al (2008), by assuming that
the government can credibly commit to the announced tax and expenditure
policy.
The government’s decision variables are the labor and capital tax rates,
τt and θt, as well as the provision of the public good, Gt,i nb o t hp e r i o d s .
The government is also allowed to borrow funds, B1,o nt h ew o r l dm a r k e t
in the ﬁrst period which must be repaid with interest in the second period.
13T h eg o v e r n m e n t ´ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti ne a c ht i m ep e r i o di sw r i t t e na s
G1 = θ1K1 (τ1,θ 1)+τ1w1 (θ1)l1 (ω1)N1 + B1 (22)
G2 = θ2K2 (τ2,θ 2,M)+τ2w2 (θ2)l2 (ω2)(N1 − M) − (1 + ¯ r2)B1 (23)
The government also recognizes that emigration is determined by equation
(13) and includes it as an additional restriction in its optimization prob-
lem. We can then write the Lagrangian corresponding to the government´s
maximization problem as
L = V (ω,G)+γ1 [θ1K1 (τ1,θ 1)+τ1w1 (θ1)l1 (ω1)N1 + B1 − G1]
+ γ2 [θ2K2 (τ2,θ 2,M)+τ2w2 (θ2)l2 (ω2)(N1 − M) − (1 + ¯ r2)B1 − G2]
+ κ[M − N1D(pm(ω1,ω 2,G 2))] (24)
where γ1, γ2 and κ a r eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e r s .T h eﬁrst-order conditions are
presented in the Appendix.
3.1 Optimal Policy in the Absence of Emigration
Let us, as a point of reference, brieﬂy characterize the optimal policy in the













where αt is deﬁned to be the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) in real
terms, MRSt is the marginal rate of substitution between the public and
the private good and ε is the (constant) labor supply elasticity of the net
wage. It is now straightforward to show that in the absence of migration,




















where "∗" indicates an optimal value. One can show that αt > 1 in at least
one of the two time periods and we will interpret the policy rules conditional
on that αt > 1 in both time periods.
Equations (26) and (27) basically imply that the optimal tax rates are
inversely related to the respective factor price elasticities. Since capital is
perfectly mobile (inﬁnitely elastic), whereas the labor supply elasticity is
ﬁnite, the capital tax rate is zero while the labor income tax rate is positive.
Equation in (28) is a modiﬁed Samuelson rule. Since the marginal rate
of transformation, MRTt, between the private and the public good is one,
the modiﬁed Samuelson rule in the presence of a distortionary tax on labor
implies N1MRSt >MR T t. All these results are standard and well known in
the literature.
Finally, observe that because θ∗
t =0 ,w ec a nc o m b i n ee q u a t i o n s( 2 7 )















This eﬃciency condition gives the relationship between τ∗
t and G∗
t (where
the latter appears in MRSt) in the second-best optimum. Equation (29)
will serve as a point of reference when we evaluate the optimal policies to be
derived below.
153.2 Optimal Policy in the Presence of Emigration
Before we characterize the optimal policy in the presence of emigration, let
us ask the following question: if the government determines the optimal
tax and expenditure policy without recognizing how the policy instruments
inﬂuence emigration, what will be the welfare eﬀect of an exogenous increase
in M? To answer this question, observe that if the government chooses
the optimal policy conditional on M, it maximizes the Lagrangian in (24)
without recognizing the last constraint in (24), i.e. the restriction M =
N1D(pm(ω1,ω 2,G 2)) would be redundant. By using the Envelope Theorem,
we can derive the following result;
Proposition 1: If the government treats the level of emigration as exogenous
when it determines the optimal policy, the welfare eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nM
is negative and given by
∂L
∂M
= −γ2τ2w2l2 < 0
The explanation for this negative welfare eﬀe c ti st h a te m i g r a t i o nc a u s e sa
negative ﬁscal externality because when a private agent chooses to emigrate,
he/she does not take into account that this will erode the future tax base for
labor in the home country.
Proposition 1 implies that the government has an incentive to reduce the
level of emigration. Let us, therefore, turn to the optimal policy when the






where κ = γ2τ2w2l2, one can show that the optimal policy in period t, t =1 ,2,


































where the derivations are presented in the Appendix. Compared with the
optimal policy in the absence of emigration, given by equations (26) - (28),
we see that (i) the capital tax rates are still zero, (ii) the labor income tax
formulas contain an additional term which is explicitly related to emigration,
and (iii) emigration inﬂuences the provision of the public good in the second
period.
We begin by interpreting the optimal labor income tax rate in period one.
I fw em a k eu s eo ft h a te q u a t i o n( 1 5 )d e ﬁnes ∂M/∂ω1, the following results
immediately follows;
Proposition 2: Case(i): If agents can freely borrow funds on the capital
market, and if ¯ ω2 is suﬃciently high to imply xm
1 >x 1, then the presence of
emigration provides the government with an incentive to tax labor in period
one at a lower rate than otherwise.
Case(ii): If agents face a credit restriction so that the saving is zero, then
the presence of emigration provides the government with an incentive to tax
l a b o ri np e r i o do n ea tah i g h e rrate than otherwise.
To explain the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2, recall from the discussion in Section
2.2 that if xm
1 >x 1 so that u0 (xm
1 ) <u 0 (x1), then a reduction of τ1 will have
al a r g e re ﬀect on the utility of a nonemigrating agent than on the utility of
17an emigrating agent. As a consequence, the previously marginal agent (who
before the tax cut was indiﬀerent between emigrating and staying at home)
will, after the tax cut, have a higher utility if he/she does not emigrate than
if he/she emigrates. This means that the previously marginal agent will now
choose to stay at home rather than to emigrate. Hence, in case (i) there will
be a positive relationship between M and τ1. This provides the government
with an incentive to set τ1 at a lower rate than otherwise.
As for the second part of the Proposition, observe that in the presence of
a binding credit restriction, the ﬁrst period consumption levels for a nonem-
igrating agent and the marginal agent satisfy
c1 = ω1l1 (ω1) >c
m
1 = ω1l1 (ω1) − p (34)
Since x = c − e(l), this inequality implies xm
1 <x 1 and u0 (xm
1 ) >u 0 (x1).I n
this case, an increase in τ1, which decreases the ﬁrst period net wage, will
have a negative eﬀect on the utilities of both emigrating and nonemigrating
agents. However, because u0 (xm
1 ) >u 0 (x1), the utility loss will be larger for
the emigrating agents. For the previously marginal agent, the alternative
not to emigrate will now dominate over the alternative to emigrate, which
means that the number of agents who choose to emigrate is reduced. This
argument implies a negative relationship between M and τ1 in Case (ii),
which provides the government with an incentive to set the labor tax at a
higher rate than otherwise.
Finally, observe that emigration does not directly inﬂuence the provision
of the public good in period one (equation (32) does not contain any term
directly linked to emigration). The explanation is that since the utility is
additively separable in G, the provision of the public good will not inﬂuence
the utility diﬀerence between emigrating or remaining at home. However,
18the provision of the public good will be indirectly inﬂuenced by emigra-
tion because the tax rate, and hence the tax revenues, will be inﬂuenced
by emigration. This can be seen more clearly if we combine equations (31)





















Compared with equation (29), equation (35) implies that emigration will
inﬂuence the relationship between τ∗
1 and G∗
1.
Let us now turn to the optimal policy in the second period. Beginning
with the tax formula for τ∗
2, note that the last term in equation (31) is
proportional to ∂M/∂ω2.S i n c e∂M/∂ω2 < 0, it shows that in the presence
of emigration, the government has an incentive to tax labor in the second
period at a lower rate than in the absence of emigration. The inutition is
that, all else equal, a lower tax on labor in the second period will improve
the utility of a nonemigrating agent by more relative to that of an emigrating
agent. This will, in turn, reduce the number of emigrating agents.
As for the provision of the public good in period two, equation (33) shows
that since ∂M/∂G2 < 0, the presence of emigration will, all else equal,
provide the government with an incentive to overprovide the public good.
The intuition is that by providing more of the public good in period two, the
relative utility of a nonemigrating agent visavi the utility of an emigrating
agent is improved, which has a negative eﬀect on emigration.
Observe that the policy in period two features two conﬂicting motives.
On one hand, emigration produces an incentive to reduce the labor income
tax, which reduces the potential to provide the public good, and on the
other hand emigration provides an incentive to increase the expenditure on
19the public good. Which motive will dominate? To answer this question, we
combine equations (31) and (33) with the expressions for the comparative
static derivatives for ∂M/∂ω2 and ∂M/∂G2, respectively, to derive the overall
eﬃciency condition for the optimal tax and expenditure policy in period two.
We can then derive the following result;
Proposition 3: The presence of emigration will not directly inﬂuence the
optimal tax and expenditure policy in period two.
To prove Proposition 3, let us consider the overall eﬃciency condition for the















By comparing equation (36) with equation (29), we see that the overall ef-
ﬁciency condition is equivalent to that which would follow in the absence of
emigration, which implies that the presence of emigration will not inﬂuence
the policy rule that determines the relationship between the labor tax and
the provision of the public good in period two. To see the intuition behind
this result, recall that the number of emigrants is implicitly determined by
equation (13). One implication of this equation is that the second period util-
ity for nonemigrating agents is negatively related to emigration. Therefore,
to minimize emigration, the government should maximize the second period
utility of the nonemigrating agents. However, since the government´s objec-
tive already features maximizing the utility of the nonemigrating agents, the
emigration constraint will not conﬂict with - or add any new dimension - to
the government´s basic objective. In particular, since the basic objective is
to choose τ2 and G2 in order to maximize the second period utility, regardless
of whether the emigration constraint is present or not in the government´s
20optimization problem, and since there is a unique relationship between τ2 and
G2 w h i c ha c h i e v e st h i s( g i v e nb yt h eo v e r a l le ﬃciency condition in equation
(29)), the relationship between τ2 and G2 will not be directly inﬂuenced by
the presence of emigration.
One consequence of the argument above is that the government has an
incentive to transfer resources from period one to period two. To see this,
note ﬁrst that in the absence of emigration, the optimality condition which






If we use the deﬁnition MRSt = η0 (Gt)/u0 (ct) and the government’s ﬁrst-
order condition for public good provision in period one and two, respectively,





(1 + ¯ r2)βu0 (x2)
(38)
If the credit restriction does not bind, we can also use equation (8) in which
case equation (38) reduces to MRS2/MRS1 =1 . This latter condition shows
that (i) in the absence of emigration and (ii) in the absence of a binding credit
restriction, the government’s net borrowing is such that the marginal rates
of substitution between the public and private goods are equalized between
the time periods.
However, in the presence of emigration and with a binding credit restric-























21Since ∂M/∂G2 < 0, the second term on the right hand side of both equation
(39) and equation (40) is negative, which indicates that the presence of emi-
gration provides the government with an incentive to provide relatively more
o ft h ep u b l i cg o o di np e r i o dt w ot h a ni np e r i o do n e . T h i si sa c h i e v e db y
transfering resources from the ﬁrst period to the second. We can summarize
this result in the following Proposition;
Proposition 4: In the presence of emigration, the government has an in-
centive to transfer more resources than otherwise to the second period. This
means that the net borrowing in period one will be smaller than otherwise.
To give the intuition for this result, recall that to minimize emigration, the
government needs to maximize the utility of the nonemigrating agents. Note,
however, that since both emigrating and nonemigrating households live in the
home country in the ﬁrst period, any policy which maximizes the utility of a
nonemigrating agent in period one also improves the ﬁrst period utility of an
emigrating agent. This implies that any policy aimed to reduce emigration
by improving the ﬁrst period utility of the nonemigrating agents is partially
oﬀset because it simultaneously improves the utility of the emigrating agents.
This is not the case in period two because any policy which improves the
second period utility of the nonemigrating agents will not spill over to the
second period utility of the emigrating households. Hence, to achieve the
goal of minimizing emigration by improving the utility of a nonemigrating
agent, there is ”more bang for the buck” by improving the second period
utility rather than by improving the ﬁrst period utility. On the margin, it
will therefore be optimal to transfer government funds from period one to
period two which can be used to improve the second period utility of the
nonemigrating agent.
224 Heterogenous Agents
Let us now extend the model and assume that the economy is made up of
two types of agents, denoted type 1 and type 2, respectively. The agents
diﬀer in terms of labor productivity, with type 1 agents being low-skilled and
type 2 agents being high-skilled. In line with the bulk of the literature on
migration, we assume that the high-skilled agents are mobile across borders
whereas the low-skilled are not. This means that equation (13) now deﬁnes a
marginal agent which is high-skilled and that emigration equation (14) now
applies to high-skilled agents.
Since the economy now consists of two agent types, we expand the model
to contain two production sectors, denoted 1 and 2. We assume that only
high-skilled labor can be used in the production process in sector 2. To keep
t h em o d e la ss i m p l ea sp o s s i b l e ,w ea l s oa s s u m et h a tt h ew a g ei ns e c t o r2
always exceeds the wage in sector 1. This implies that all high-skilled agents
will prefer to work in sector 2 whereas all low-skilled agents will work in
sector 1. Both sectors produce the same output good and in sector 1, a
linear technology is used in the production process, whereas sector 2 uses the
production technology described in Section 2.3.












where the superindex denotes ability type and φ is the relative weight of
t h et y p e2a g e n ti nt h ew e l f a r ef u n c t i o n . W ea s s u m et h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
chooses a linear income tax rate in each time period which applies to both
ability types. Since capital is perfectly mobile across borders, we know from
the analysis above that it will be set to zero and therefore we do not include
a capital tax in this part of the analysis. The budget constraints for the two


















































− (1 + ¯ r2)B1 (43)
where ωi
t =( 1− τt)wi
t for i =1 ,2.
The Lagrangian corresponding to this optimization problem, as well as
the ﬁrst-order conditions, are presented in the Appendix and we begin by
characterizing the optimal policy in period one. By combining the ﬁrst-
order conditions for τ1 and G1 to obtain the overall eﬃciency condition for
the optimal tax and expenditure policy in period one, we can derive the
following result;
Proposition 5: With heterogenous agents, and in the presence of emigra-










































































To interpret this tax formula, observe that the last term in the tax formula
in Proposition 5 reﬂects emigration, and that the sign of this term depends
on the sign of ∂M/∂ω2




















24If we compare equation (44) with equation (15) in Section 2.2, we see that the
former is identical to the latter, except that the marginal utility diﬀerence on
the right hand side of (44) now refers to type 2 agents. This, in turn, means
that we can interpret the sign of ∂M/∂ω2
1 along the same lines as we inter-
preted the corresponding term in equation (15). Furthermore, since ∂M/∂ω2
1
enters the tax formula in Proposition 5 in a similar way as the corresponding
emigration term enters the tax formula in equation (31) in Section 3.2, we
can interpret it in the same way as we interpreted the corresponding term in
the tax formula for the labor income tax rate when agents are homogenous,
summarized in Proposition 2.
Let us proceed to characterize the optimal policy in the second period.
In this case, we can derive the following result;
Proposition 6: With heterogenous agents, and in the presence of emigra-
tion, the optimal tax and expenditure policy in period two is characterized by















































































To interpret the tax formula in Proposition 6, observe ﬁrst that in the ab-
sence of emigration, the term Ψ2 would be zero (because κ would be zero),
whereas Ψ2 will be positive in the presence of emgiration. Hence, when
agents are heterogenous, the optimal policy will be inﬂuenced by the pres-
ence of emigration. This diﬀers from the result in the previous section, where
25we showed that when agents are homogenous, the economic policy in period
two is invariant to emigration.
To explain why the economic policy is not invariant to emigration when
agents are heterogenous, recall that with homogenous agents, there is no
conﬂict between the government´s objective function (which is to maximize
the utility of the nonemigrating agents) and the objective of minimizing em-
igration (which is achieved by maximizing the second period utility of the
nonemigrating agents). On the other hand, when the agents are heteroge-
nous, the overall objective to maximize the weighted sum of utilities over
both ability types (equation (41)) no longer coincides with the objective func-
tion that needs to be maximized in order to minimize emigration. Therefore,
the emigration constraint that now appears in the government´s problem
eﬀectively serves to attach a higher weight to the utility of the nonemigrat-
i n gt y p e2a g e n tr e l a t i v et h en o n e m i g r a t i n gt y p e1a g e n t . T h i sa d d i t i o n a l
weight is the term Ψ2 in the tax formula in Proposition 6 and it appears
in two places: in the numerator and the denominator in the quotient in-
side the square bracket. The appearance of Ψ2 in the numerator induces
the government to set the labor tax at a lower rate than otherwise, whereas
the appearance of Ψ2 in the denominator provides the government with an
incentive to tax labor at a higher rate than otherwise in order to provide
more of the public good. The net eﬀect is, in general, ambiguous which re-
ﬂects that when the government maximizes the sum of utilities in equation
(41), the optimal policy will be a trade-oﬀ between the (marginal) utility of
the nonemigrating type 1 agent vis-a-vis the (marginal) utility of the none-
migrating type 2 agent. This trade-oﬀ means that from the nonemigrating
type 2 agent´s point of view, τ∗
2 may either be set "too high" or "too low"
in the second-best optimum. If the labor income tax rate is "too high", the
26nonemigrating type 2 agent´s utility would increase if τ∗
2 was reduced, and
in this case the weight Ψ2 in the numerator will dominate over the weight Ψ2
in the denominator, so that the net eﬀect of the emigration constraint is to
reduce τ∗
2. If, on the other hand, the labor income tax rate is "too low", the
nonemigrating type 2 agent´s utility would increase if τ∗
2 was set at a higher
level. In this case the weight Ψ2 in the denominator will dominate over the
weight Ψ2 in the numerator.
5 Summary and Discussion
This paper incorporates emigration in a dynamic framework into the theory
of optimal linear income taxation. We highlight the importance of credit
restrictions and focus the analysis around two special cases: when the agents
face a binding credit restriction and when there is no restriction to borrow
funds. A binding credit restriction inﬂuences emigration because agents who
want to emigrate need to forego consumption in the ﬁrst period of life in
order to save for the "ticket". If, on the other hand, the credit restriction
does not bind, agents can simply ﬁnance the emigration by borrowing on
future income.
Since the future tax base is eroded if productive agents leave the home
country, emigration gives rise to a ﬁscal externality. As such, it may ei-
ther contribute to increase or decrease the ex ante labor income tax rate in
comparison with the outcome when emigration is absent. When the credit
restriction does not bind, the presence of emigration tends to reduce the ex
ante labor income tax but if the agents face a binding credit restriction, the
presence of emigration induces the government to tax labor at a higher rate
than otherwise. Turning to the ex post labor income tax rate, the ques-
27tion whether it is aﬀected by the presence of emigration or not depends on
whether the agents are homogenous or heterogenous. If agents are homoge-
nous, the optimal tax rule for the ex post labor income tax rate is unaﬀected
by emigration, whereas if agents are heterogenous, emigration may either
increase or decrease the ex post labor income tax rate.
Future research in this area may take several directions, and we shall
point out two of them. First, the assumption that agents who emigrate do
not transfer resources back to the home country is a simpliﬁcation; another
alternative is that agents transfer resources back to the home country in
the second period. Another extension is to also model the country which
is the net receiver of immigrants. Then, it would be interesting to analyze,
for example, the simultaneous determination of policies in the country from
which there is net emigration and in the country which is a net receiver of
immigrants within the context of a Nash game.
6 Appendix
The Migration Function
To derive the properties of the migration function, equation (14), observe
that the marginal agent is deﬁned by equation (13), where
V (ω,G)=u[ω1l1 (ω1) − e(l1 (ω1)) − s1 (ω1,ω 2)] + η(G1)
+ βu[ω2l2 (ω2)+s1 (ω1,ω 2) − e(l2 (ω2))] + βη(G2) (A.1)
V (ω
◦,G
◦,p m)=u[ω1l1 (ω1) − e(l1 (ω1)) − s
◦
1 (ω1, ¯ ω2) − pm]+η(G1)




28Equation (13) implicitly deﬁnes pm as a function pm (ω,ω◦,G 2) and by diﬀer-
















































0 (pm) < 0 (A.8)
The Government’s Problem



































































































































= γ1 − (1 + ¯ r2)γ2 =0 (A.15)
∂L
∂M































To derive the optimal labor and capital tax rates in period 1, we can use









































































|Hτ| = b1a22 − b2a12
|Hθ| = a11b2 − b1a21
|H| = a11a22 − a12a21
By using the deﬁnitions of the terms in |Hτ|, |Hθ| and |H|,w e ,a f t e rs o m e
manipulations obtain the tax formulas in equations (30) and (31). In a similar
way, we can derive the tax formulas for τ2 and θ2.
To derive equation (33), we multiply ﬁrst-order condition (A.11) by N1/u0 (x1),
a n dt h e nu s et h ed e ﬁntions of MRS1 and α1. In a similar way, we can derive
31equation (??) by multiplying ﬁrst-order condition (A.14) by N2/u0 (x2),a n d
then use the deﬁntions of MRS2 and α2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5




































































































































































































































= γ1 − (1 + ¯ r2)γ2 =0 (A.24)
∂L
∂M
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